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a non-capital felony other than bribery, forgery, perjury, or larceny
in a foreign jurisdiction is a qualified juror, whereas one merely
under prosecution1" for the same offense is disqualified.
As stated by the dissenters, the primary reason for refusing to
permit convicted felons to serve as jurors is to guard against pollution of the jury system by placing its administration in the hands
of criminals.' 7 Clearly, one who has been convicted of a crime in
another jurisdiction is no better qualified morally than one who has
been similarly convicted in the courts of Florida. The law guarantees the accused a fair and impartial jury of his peers, ". . . who
8
stand, with the accused and one another, equal before the law.""
The remaining feasible method of providing this now sorely needed
safeguard for our jury system is a legislative revision of the statute
that will clearly express the intent to bar all convicted felons, regardless of where convicted, 19 from service on the juries of the state
courts of Florida.
Wtrwa

T. HAmusoN, Ja.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: EJUSDEM GENERIS
VERSUS LEGISLATIVE INTENT

United States v. Alpers, 70 Sup. Ct. 352 (1950)
Petitioner was convicted in the federal district court of depositing
for interstate shipment concededly obscene phonograph records, under
a statute1 prohibiting shipment of ". . . any obscene, lewd, lascivious,
'6See note 5 supra. The Florida Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide
whether the prosecutions referred to are limited to those before Florida courts.

In State v. Butler, 149 La. 1036, 90 So. 895 (1922), under a similar statute, a
juror charged with a federal offense was held disqualified.

17See 43 So.2d 860 at 863; Amaya v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. 160, 162, 220 S.W.
98, 99 (1920). At common law, challenge for criminality was based on lack of
fitness to serve as a juror, 3 BL. CoMM. *634.
1843 So.2d 860 at 86.
19 Accurate drafting will require a policy decision. The offenses included as a
bar to jury duty should be either: (1) all offenses that are felonies in the convicting jurisdiction; or (2) those offenses that would, if committed in Florida,
constitute felonies under Florida law.
'41

STAT.

1060, 18 U.S.C. §1462 (1948); cf.
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or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film, paper, letter,
writing, print, or other matter of indecent character ..... The court
of appeals reversed,2 reasoning that the enumerated items are alike
in being visually comprehensible, that phonograph records are, on the
contrary, aurally comprehensible, and that therefore the proper strict
construction of this penal statute excludes phonograph records as not
ejusdem generis. 3 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court,
reversing the court of appeals, H=L_, the doctrine of ejusdem generis,
though a valuable canon of construction, cannot be employed to
defeat the plain intent and purpose of Congress. 4 Justices Black,
Frankfurter and Jackson, in their dissent, took the position that the
statute imposes a form of censorship and accordingly should be very
narrowly construed.
The doctrine of ejusdem generis, 5 a specific application of the
broader maxim noscitur a sociis,6 has long been used by our courts
as a guide in construing statutes. 7 A general term following an enumeration is not construed in its broadest sense; instead, it is limited to
other items of the class illustrated by the enumeration.8 The process
. . ." In its original and
".. . or other thing. containing obscene language
somewhat abbreviated form, the statute was first enacted in 1897 as 29 STAT. 512.
The latest amendment was the 1920 addition of "motion-picture film" to the
enumerated items, 41 STAT. 1060.
2
Alpers v. United States, 175 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1949).
3The anglicized Latin "ejusdem" is properly spelled "eiusdem."
4
The majority opinion ably summarizes the intent thus at p. 354:
"The obvious purpose of the legislation under consideration was to prevent
the channels of interstate commerce from being used to disseminate any
matter that, in its essential nature, communicates obscene, lewd, lascivious or
filthy ideas."
5Literally, of the same genus. Cf. Children's Bootery v. Sutker, 91 Fla. 60, 66,
107 So. 345, 347 (1926): ". . . of the same kind . . . :'
GThe meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the
words associated with it, Evans v. City of Jackson, 202 Miss. 9, 30 So.2d 315, 317
(1947). Under this rule general and specific words, when analogous in meaning
and used together, take color from each other, with the result that the general
words are restricted by those less general, Ex parte Amos, 93 Fla. 5, 15, 112 So.
289, 293 (1927); Dunham v. State, 140 Fla. 754, 192 So. 324 (1939).
tThe origin in English law of this rule, often referred to as Lord Tenterden's
Rule, is attributed to Archbishop of Canterbury's Case, 2 Co. Rep. 46a, 76 Eng.
Rep. 519 (1596).
8
Childrens Bootery v. Sutker, 91 Fla. 60, 107 So. 345 (1926); Schleman v.
Guaranty Title Co., 153 Fla. 379, 15 So.2d 754 (1943); Main v. Benjamin Foster
Co., 141 Fla. 91, 192 So. 602 (1939); Goldsmith v. Orange Belt Securities Co.,
115 Fla. 683, 156 So. 3 (1934); Ex parte Amos, 93 Fla. 5, 112 So. 289 (1927);
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of analysis necessarily entails extraction of the common denominator
of the items enumerated. The rule has also been applied to a general
term preceding specific examples. 9

In criminal law, the genus to which a doubtful general term is
confined is traditionally the narrowest meaning; but in a few instances,
of which the principal case is a good example, the constraining effect
of the criminal character of the statute upon its construction is outweighed by a legislative intent so patent that in the eye of the court
this cannot be accidentally misunderstood by the reader of the
statute.' 0
Ejusdem generis is only a rule of construction,"- designed to facili12
tate ascertainment of the legislative intent in instances of uncertainty.
Its basis is that the legislature, when it wishes to embrace the genus
in an unrestricted sense, properly makes no mention of particular
species.' 3 The urge to give examples is a strong one, however; and
these are not generally aimed at limitation.' 4 Consequently, the
ejusdem generis doctrine is discarded when its use limits or subverts
a clearly expressed meaning. 15 The real issue, of course, is whether

the meaning is clear. If analysis of the cohtext and of the result to be
effected demonstrates that the legislature intended the general term

to be given its full meaning, the ejusdem generis rule does not
apply. 16
Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693 (1918).
9Gulf Ins. Co. v. James, 143 Tex. 424, 185 S.W.2d 966 (1945).
10Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936), especially at 128.
"Pepple v. Headrick, 74 Idaho 132, 128 P.2d 757 (1942); Lexington v.
Edgerton, 289 Ky. 815, 159 S.W.2d 1015 (1941).
12 The rule is not applicable to a statute clear in its meaning, Mason v. United
States, 260 U.S. 545 (1923); Moore v. Mobile, 248 Ala. 436, 28 So.2d 203
(1946); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 113 Fla. 361, 152 So. 200 (1934); indeed, the
instant decision can be said to rest squarely on this principle.
13 E.g., In re Bush Terminal Co., 93 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1938); Morgan v.
State, 44 So.2d 45 (Miss. 1950); Shaw v. Kendall, 114 Mont. 323, 136 P.2d 748
(1943).
141n drafting contracts, e.g., the phrase "including without limitation," followed by illustrations, is frequently utilized. This device is not readily applied in
drafting criminal statutes, however.
15Fitch Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 582 (1945); United States v. Gilliland,
312 U.S. 86 (1941); Willard v. First Security Bank of Idaho, 206 P.2d 770 (Idaho
1949); Couch v. State, 71 Okla. Cr. 223, 110 P.2d 613 (1941); Knoxtenn Theatres
v. McCanless, 177 Tenn. 497, 151 S.W.2d 164 (1941).
16Fitch Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 582 (1945); SEC v. Joiner Corp., 320
U.S. 344 (1943); Moore v. Mobile, 248 Ala. 436, 28 So.2d 203 (1946); Lexington
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The doctrine is also inapplicable to an enumeration of specific
items differing greatly among themselves,' 7 as well as to any list
sufficiently comprehensive to exhaust the genus, thereby leaving8
nothing essentially similar upon which the general term can operate.'
To employ the rule under such circumstances would violate another
established rule of construction, namely, that effect should be given
to every part of a statute if possible. 19
Inasmuch as the effect of ejusdem generis is normally restrictive,
its greatest use arises in the interpretation of criminal statutes, 20 which
must be strictly construed in favor of the accused.2 1 The dissenting
justices in the principal case, as well as the court of appeals, opposed
extension of the general words ". . . or other matter of indecent character . . ." to include an object not in the same comprehensibility
class with the enumerated items. The fact remains, however, that
courts do not normally disregard an obvious legislative intent; and
the ejusdem generis rule has not been accepted, even in criminal cases,
when its application conflicts with a general purpose adequately
22
formulated.
The passing of time after the adoption of a statute and the subsequent invention of new matter may prompt the court to disregard
v. Edgerton, 289 Ky. 815, 159 S.W.2d 1015 (1941).
'7Bedford v. Johnson, 102 Colo. 203, 78 P.2d 873 (1988); Morgan v. State,
44 So.2d 45 (Miss. 1950).
' 8 Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545 (1923); Schleman v. Guaranty Title
Co., 158 Fla. 379, 15 So.2d 754 (1943); Misch v. Russell, 186 Ill. 22, 26 N.E.
528 (1891); Knoxtenn Theatres v. McCanless, 177 Tenn. 497, 151 S.W.2d 164
(1941).
19 Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Mason v. United States,
260 U.S. 545 (1923); Children's Bootery v. Sutker, 91 Fla. 60, 107 So. 345
(1926); Misch v. Russell, 186 Ill. 22, 26 N.E. 528 (1891); see, e.g., Crawford v.
Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 54, 59 So. 963, 968 (1912); State v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293,
385, 39 So. 929, 958 (1905).
2oUnited States v. Salen, 235 U.S. 237 (1914); First Nat. Bank of Anamoose
v. United States, 206 Fed. 374 (8th Cir. 1913); Dunham v. State, 140 Fla. 754,
192 So. 324 (1939); Ex parte Amos, 93 Fla. 5, 112 So. 289 (1927); cf. Jefferson
County Fiscal Court v. Jefferson County, 278 Ky. 68, 128 S.W.2d 230 (1939).
92United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76 (U.S. 1820); Watson v. Stone,
348 Fla. 516, 4 So.2d 700 (1941); State v. Coleman, 131 Fla. 892, 180 So. 357
(1938).
22
while penal
Cf. Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936): "...
sense of
of
that
rejection
require
not
this
does
statutes are narrowly construed,
the words which best harmonizes with the context and the end in view." See also
United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 (1941); United States v. Wiltberger, 5
Wheat. 76 (U.S. 1820).
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the ejusdem generis rule and to place the new item within the general
term. 23 Such a result can be reached on the logical ground that the
legislature cannot possibly anticipate and enumerate all of the various
devices that men contrive; specification of existing examples should
adequately portray the nature of the prohibition. 24
While there is little doubt that Congress, if it had adverted to the
factual situation here involved, would have prescribed the result
obtained in the principal case, the mere existence of legislative intent
is not in itself sufficient to warrant a loose application of a statute
restricting freedom of expression or branding certain conduct as
criminal.

Nevertheless, the majority properly ruled out the ejusdem generis
canon in the principal case, it is submitted. "Lewdness," traditionally
difficult to define with accuracy, was conceded. The sole issue was
whether communication of ideas admittedly lewd becomes any less
a dissemination because communicated by ear rather than by eye.
Stripped of legal verbiage, the problem loses its complexity; the
words " . . . or other matter

. .

." are obviously designed to proscribe

all methods of disseminating lewd ideas. The vagueness, if vagueness
there be, lies in the concept expressed by "lewdness" rather than in
the means used for communication. In the latter respect the reader
of normal intelligence could not be misled by the language of the
statute.
GEORGE A.

DIETz

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: COMPENSABLE SUICIDE
Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 48 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1949)
Claimant's husband, while employed by appellee, fell from a roof
and sustained severe injuries. He subsequently suffered excruciating
pain, became morose and ill-humored, and three months after the
23
Cain v. Bowlby, 114 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1940); cf. the discussion of
Aristotelian and Ciceronian views in CAmNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO

HEGEL 154-156 (1949).
24
Pepple v. Headrick, 64 Idaho 132, 128 P.2d 757 (1942); Hackerman v.
State, 223 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tenn. 1949), "Gaming is a popular sport and has
too many angles to define." See, e.g., FLA. STAT. C. 849 (1949), particularly
§849.08, ". . . cards, keno, roulette, faro or other games of chance ....
"
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